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Abstract 
A network is a graph where the nodes represent agents and an arc exists between two 
nodes if the corresponding agents interact bilaterally. An exogeneous value function gives 
the value of each network, while an allocation rule describes how the value of any graph 
is distributed amongst the agents. We explore the possibility of constructing allocation 
rules which will ensure that efficient networks of agents will form when the individual 
agents decide to form or severe links amongst themselves. 
Stable Networks* 
Bhaskar Dutta Suresh Mutuswami 
1 Introduction 
The interaction between agents can often be fruitfully described by a network structure 
or graph, where the nodes represent the agents and an arc exists between two nodes if 
the corresponding agents interact bilaterally. Network structures have been used in a 
wide variety of contexts, ranging from social networks (Wellman and Berkowitz (1988)), 
information transmission (Goyal (1993)), internal organization of firms (Marschak and 
Reichelstein (1993J ), to the structure of airline routes (Hendricks, Piccione and Tan
(1995) ) 1.
In a recent paper, Jackson and Wolinsky (1995) focus on the stability of networks. 
Their analysis is designed to give predictions concerning which networks are likely to 
form when self-interested agents can choose to form new links or severe existing links. 
They use a specification where a value function gives the value (or total product) of 
each graph or network, while an allocation rule gives the distribution of value amongst 
the agents forming the network. A principal result of their analysis shows that efficient 
graphs (that is, graphs of maximum value) may not be stable when the allocation rule 
treats individuals symmetrically. 
The main purpose of this paper is to subject the potential conflict between stability 
and efficiency of graphs to further scrutiny. In order to do this, we follow Dutta, et. al. 
(1995) and assume that agents' decisions on whether or not to form a link with other 
agents can be represented as a game in strategic form2. In this "link formation" game,
each player announces a set of players with whom he or she wants to form a link. A 
link between two players is formed if both players want the link. This rule determines 
*We are most grateful to Matthew Jackson for several helpful discussions and suggestions. Thanks 
are also due to Sudipto Bhattacharya for comments on an earlier version of the paper. This version 
of the paper was written when the first author was visiting Caltech. Their hospitality is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
1See van den Nouweland (1993) and Sharkey (1995) for detailed surveys and additional references. 
2This game was originally suggested by Myerson (1991), and subsequently used by Qin (1993). See 
also Hart and Kurz (1983) who discuss a similar strategic form game in the context of the endogenous 
formation of coalition structures. 
the graph corresponding to any n-tuple of announcements. The value function and the 
allocation rule then give the payoff function of the strategic form game. 
Since the link formation game is a well-defined strategic form game, one can use any 
equilibrium concept to analyze the formation of networks. In this paper we will define 
a graph to be strongly stable (respectively weakly stable) if it corresponds to a strong 
Nash equilibrium (respectively coalition proof Nash equilibrium) of the link formation 
game. Although Jackson and Wolinsky (1995) did not use the link formation game, their 
specification assumed that only two-person coalitions can form; their notion of pairwise 
stability is implied by our concept of strong stability. Hence, it follows straightaway 
from their analysis that there is a conflict between strong stability and efficiency if the 
allocation rule is symmetric. 
How can we ensure that efficient graphs will form? One possibility is to use allocation 
rules which are not symmetric. For instance, fix a vector of weights w = ( w1, w2, • . •  , w n)·
Call an allocation rule w-fair if the gains or losses to players i and j from the formation 
of the new link (ij) is proportional to �· w-fair rules are symmetric only if Wi = Wj 
J 
for all i and j. However, the vector of weights w can be chosen so that there is only a 
'slight' departure from symmetry. We first show that the class of w-fair rules coincides 
with the class of weighted Shapley values of an appropriately defined transferable-utility 
game. We then go on to construct a value function under which no efficient graph is 
strongly stable for any w-fair allocation rule. Thus, the relaxation of symmetry in this 
direction does not help. 
A second possibility is to use weak stability instead of strong stability. However, again 
we demonstrate a conflict between efficiency, symmetry and (weak) stability. 
We then go on to adopt an implementation or mechanism design approach. Suppose 
the implicit assumption or prediction is that only those graphs which correspond to strong 
Nash equilibria of the link formation game will form. Then our interest in the ethical 
properties of the allocation rule should be restricted only to how the rule behaves on the 
class of these graphs. Hence, if we want symmetry of the allocation rule, we should be 
satisfied if the allocation rule is symmetric on the subdomain of strongly stable graphs. 
We analyze two specific problems within this general approach. In the first design 
problem we construct an allocation rule which ensures that; (i) the class of strongly 
stable graphs is a nonempty subset of the set of efficient graphs, and (ii) satisfies the 
restriction that the rule is symmetric on the class of strongly stable graphs. This result 
is proved under a very mild restriction on the class of value functions. The second result 
is much stronger, but is proved for a more restrictive class of value functions. More 
specifically, we construct an allocation rule which (given the restrictions on the class of 
value functions) ensures that; (i) there is at least one strongly stable graph, (ii) all weakly 
stable graphs are efficient, and (iii) the allocation rule is symmetric on the class of weakly 
stable graphs. Thus, this achieves a kind of 'double' implementation in Strong Nash and 
Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. 
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A common feature of the allocation rules constructed by us is that these distribute the 
value of stable graphs equally amongst all agents. Obviously, this ensures symmetry of 
the allocation rules on the class of stable graphs. Of course, the rules do not treat agents 
symmetrically on some graphs which are not stable. Indeed, the nonsymmetries are 
carefully constructed so as to ensure that the other requirements of the design problem(s) 
are satisfied. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we provide definitions of some 
key concepts. Section 3 describes the link formation game, while section 4 contains the 
results. We conclude in section 5. 
2 Some Definitions 
Let N = {1, 2, . . .  , n} be a finite set of agents with n � 3. Interactions between agents 
are represented by graphs whose vertices represent the players, and whose arcs depict 
the pairwise relations. The complete graph, denoted gN, is the set of all subsets of N of 
size 2. G is the set of all possible graphs on N, so that G ={gig C gN}. 
Given any g E G, let N(g) = {i E Nl::Jj such that (ij) E g}. 
The link ( ij) is the subset of N containing i, j. g + ( ij) and g --( ij) are the graphs 
obtained from g by adding and subtracting the link ( ij) respectively. 
i and j are connected in g if there is a sequence { i0, i1, . .. , i K} such that i0 = i, i K = j 
and (ikik+i) E g for all k = 0, 1, . . .  , K-1. We will use C(g) to denote the set of connected 
components of g. 3 g is said to be fully connected (respectively connected on S) if all pairs 
of agents in N (respectively in S) are connected. g is totally disconnected if g = {0}. If 
his a component of g, then N(h) = {il(ij) Eh for some j E N\{i}}, and nh denotes 
the cardinality of N(h). 
The value of a graph is represented by a function v : G -t R. We will only be 
interested in the set V of such functions satisfying Component Additivity. 
Definition 2 .1 : A value function is component additive if v(g) = l:hEC(g) v(h)4. 
We interpret the value function to indicate the total "output" produced by agents in 
N when they are "organized" according to a particular graph. For instance, the members 
of N may be workers in a firm. The graph g then represents the internal organization 
of the firm, that is the structure of communication amongst the workers. Alternatively, 
N could be a set of (tax) auditors and supervisors, and g could represent a particular 
3We use the (harmless) convention that an isolated player, that is, a player who is not connected to 
any other player in g is not considered to be a component. 
4In common with Jackson and Wolinsky, we are implicitly assuming that the value of a disconnected 
player is zero. This assumption can be dropped at the cost of some complicated notation. 
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hierarchical structure of auditors and supervisors. In this case v(g) is the (expected) tax 
revenue realized from a population of tax payers when g is in "operation." 
It is worth emphasizing at this point that the value function is a very general concept. 
In particular, it is more general than Myerson's (1977) games with cooperation structure. 
A cooperation structure is a graph in our terminology. Given any exogenously specified 
transferable utility game (N, u) and a graph g, we define for each Sc N, the restricted 
graph on S as glS- {(ij) E gli, j  ES}. The graph-restricted game (N, uY) specifies the 
worth of a coalition as follows. 
For all S C  N, u9(S) = L u(N(h)) 
hEC(glS) 
(2.1) 
As (2.1) makes clear, the value or worth of a given set of agents in Myerson's formu­
lation depends on whether they are connected or not, whereas in the Jackson-Wolinsky 
approach, the value of a coalition can in principle depend on how they are connected. 
Given v, g is strongly efficient if v(g) 2: v(g') for all g' E G. Let E(v) denote the set 
of strongly efficient graphs. 
Finally, an allocation rule Y : G x V -+ RN describes how the value associated with 
each network is distributed to the individual players. Yi(g, v) will denote the payoff to 
player i from graph g under the value function v. Clearly, any allocation rule corresponds 
to the concept of a solution in cooperative game theory. 
Given a permutation 7r : N-+ N, let g'ff = {(ij)li = 7r(k) , j = 7r(£), (k£) E g}. Let 
v'ff be defined by v'ff(g'ff) = v(g). 
The following condition imposes the restriction that all agents should be treated 
symmetrically by the allocation rule. In particular, names of the agents should not 
determine their allocation. 
Definition 2 .2 : Y is anonymous on G' s;;; G if for all pairs (g, v) E G' x V, and for all 
permutations 7r, Y7r(i)(g\ v'ff) = Yi(g, v) . 
Remark 2 .3 : If Y is anonymous on G, we say that Y is fully anonymous. 
Definition 2 .4 : Y is component balanced if L,iEN(h) Yi (g, v) = v ( h) for every g E G, h E 
C(g) . 
Component balance implies that cross-subsidization is ruled out. We will restrict 
attention to component balanced allocation rules throughout the paper5. 
5 Jackson and Wolinsky (1995) point out that the conflict between anonymity, stability and efficiency 
disappears if the rule is not component balanced. 
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3 The Link Formation Game 
In this section, we describe the strategic form game which will be used to model the 
endogenous formation of networks or graphs6. The following description of the link 
formation game assumes a specific value function v and an allocation rule Y. Let 'Y = 
(v, Y). 
The linking game r('Y) is given by the (n + 2) - tuple (N; S1, ...  , Sn, j"t), where for 
each i E N, Si is player i 's strategy set with Si = 2Nl{i} and the payoff function is the 
mapping f'Y : S 
_ IliEN Si =} JR
N given by 
(3.1) 
for all s E S, with 
(3.2) 
So a typical strategy of player i in r( ry) consists of the set of players with whom i 
wants to form a link. Then, (3.2) states that a link between i and j forms if and only 
if they both want to form this link. Hence, each strategy vector gives rise to a unique 
graph g(s) . Finally, the payoff to player i associated with s is simply Yi(v, g(s)), the 
payoff that is given by the allocation rule for the graph induced by s7. 
We now define some equilibrium concepts for r ( 'Y). 
Definition 3.1 : A strategy vector s* E S is a Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE) of r(!') 
if there is no T � N and 's E S such that 
(i) si = si for all i tj. T. 
(ii) J/(s) > J?(s*) for all i ET. 
The second equilibrium concept that will be used in this paper is that of coalition 
proof Nash Equilibrium ( CPNE). In order to define the concept of CPNE of r( 'Y), we 
need some more notation. For any T C N, and s�IT E SNIT - IliENIT Si, let r( "(, s�1T) 
denote the game induced on T by s�IT' So, 
(3.3) 
where for all j ET, for all STE ST , f](sT) = f](sT, s�IT) .  
6 Aumann and Myerson (1988) use an extensive form approach in modeling the endogenous formation 
of cooperation structures. 
7We will say that g is induced bys if g = g(s) , where g(s) satisfies (3.2). 
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The set of CPNE of r(!') is defined inductively on the set of players. 
Definition 3.2 : In a single-player game, s* is a CPNE of r(!') iff si maximizes f?(s) 
over S. Let r(1) be a game with n players, where n > 1. Suppose CPNE have been 
defined for all games with less than n players. Then, (i) s* E S is self-enforcing if for 
all T c N, sr is a CPNE of r(!', s�1T) ;  and (ii) s* E S is a CPNE of r(!') if it is 
self-enforcing and moreover there does not exist another self-enforcing strategy vector 
s E S  such that f?(s) > f?(s*) for all i E N. 
Our interest lies not in the strategy vectors which are SNE or CPNE of r(!') , but in 
the graphs which are induced by these equilibria. This motivates the following definition. 
Definition 3.3 : g* is strongly stable [respectively weakly stable] for I= (v, Y) if g* is 
induced by some s which is a SNE [re�pectiy�Jy C:PNEJ ofT(7). 
Hence, a strongly stable graph is induced or supported by a strategy vector which is 
a strong Nash equilibrium of the linking game. Of course, a strongly stable graph must 
also be weakly stable. 
Finally, in order to compare the Jackson-Wolinsky notion of pairwise stability, sup­
pose the following constraints are imposed on the set of possible deviations in Definition 
3.1. First, the deviating coalition can contain at most two agents. Second, the deviation 
can consist of severing just one existing link or forming one additional link. Then, the 
set of graphs which are immune to such deviations is called pairwise stable. Obviously, 
if g* is strongly stable, then it must be pairwise stable. 
4 The Results 
Notice that strong stability (as well as weak stability) has been defined for a specific 
value function v and allocation rule Y. Of course, which network structure is likely to 
form must depend upon both the value function as well as on the allocation rule. Here, 
we adopt the approach that the value function is given exogenously, while the allocation 
rule itself can be "chosen" or "designed".  
Within this general approach, it is natural to seek to construct allocation rules which 
are (ethically) attractive and which also lead to the formation of stable network structures 
which maximize output, no matter what the exogenously specified value function. This is 
presumably the underlying motive behind Jackson and Wolinsky's search for a symmetric 
allocation rule under which at least one strongly efficient graph would be pairwise stable. 
Given their negative result, we initially impose weaker requirements. First, instead 
of full anonymity, we only ask that the allocation rule be w-fair, a condition which is 
defined presently. However, we show that there can be value functions under which 
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no strongly efficient graph is strongly stable8. Second, we retain (full anonymity), but 
replace strong stability by weak stability. Again, we construct a value function under 
which the (unique) strongly efficient graph is not weakly stable. 
Our final results, which are the main results of the paper, explicitly adopt an imple­
mentation approach to the problem. Assuming that strong Nash equilibrium is the "ap­
propriate" concept of equilibrium and that the individual agents decide to form network 
relations through the link formation game is equivalent to predicting that only strongly 
stable graphs will form. Let S( ry) be the set of strongly stable graphs corresponding to 
ry ( v, Y). Instead of imposing full anonymity, we only require that the allocation rule 
be anonymous on the restricted domain S("!) .  However, we now require that for all per­
missible value functions, S(ry) is contained in the set of strongly efficient graphs, instead 
of merely intersecting with it, which was the "target" sought to be achieved in the earlier 
results. We are able to construct an allocation rule which satisfies these requirements. 
Suppose, however, that the designer has some doubt whether strong Nash equilibrium 
is really the "appropriate" notion of equilibrium. In particular, she apprehends that 
weakly stable graphs may also form. Then, she would want to ensure anonymity of the 
allocation rule over the larger class of weakly stable graphs, as well as efficiency of these 
graphs. Assuming a stronger restriction on the class of permissible value functions, we 
are able to construct an allocation rule which satisfies these requirements. In addition, 
the allocation rule also guarantees that the set of strongly stable graphs is nonempty. 
Our first result uses w-fairness. Fix a vector w = (w1, ... , w n) · 
Definition 4.1 : An allocation rule Y is w-fair, if for all v E V, for all g E G, for all 
i, j  E N, �i[Yi(g, v)-Yi(g-(ij), v) ] = �i[Yj(g, v)-Yj(g-(ij), v) ] . 
In Proposition 4.1 below, we show that the unique allocation rule which satisfies 
w-fairness and component balance is the Weighted Shapley value of the following char­
acteristic function game. 
Take any ( v, g) E V x G. Recall that for any S � N, the restricted graph on S is 
denoted glS. Then, the TU game Uv,g is given by: 
For all S � N, Uv,9(S) = 2.:hEC(glS) v(h). 
Proposition 4.2 : For all v E V, the unique w-fair allocation rule Y which satisfies 
component balance is the weighted Shapley value of uv,g· 
Proof: : The proof is omitted since it is a straightforward extension of the corresponding 
result in Dutta, et. al. (1995). I 
Remark 4.3 : This proposition is similar to corresponding results of Dutta, et. al. 
(1995) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1995). The former proved that w-fair allocation 
8We point out below that strong stability can be replaced by pairwise stability. 
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rules satisfying component balance are the weighted Shapley values (also called weighted 
Myerson values) of the graph-restricted game given by any exogeneous TU game and 
any graph g. Of course, the set of graph-restricted games is a strict subset of V, and 
hence Proposition 4.2 is a formal generalization of their result. Jackson and Wolinsky 
show that where wi = Wj for all i, j, then the unique w-fair allocation rule satisfying 
component balance is the Shapley value of uv,g· 
Our first result on stability follows. The motivation for proving this result is the 
following . Since the weight vector w can be chosen to make the allocation rule 'approx­
imately' anonymous (by choosing w to be very close to the unit vector (1, ... , 1), we 
may 'almost' resolve the tension between stability, efficiency and symmetry unearthed 
by Jackson-Wolinsky by using such a w-fair allocation rule. However, the next result 
rules out this possibility. 
Theorem 4.4 : Suppose w » 0. Then, there is no w-fair allocation rule Y satisfying 
component balance and such that for each v E V, at least one strongly efficient graph is 
strongly stable. 
Proof: : Let N 
l:::�=l Wi = 1. 
{1, 2, 3}, and choose any w such that w1 > w2 > w3 > 0 and 
Now, consider the (component additive) v such that v({(ij)}) = 1, v({(ij), (jk)}) = 
1 + c:, and v(gN) = 1 + 2c:, where c: E (0, Hl - wi�w3 )) . 
Using Proposition 4.2, the unique w-fair allocation rule Y satisfying component bal­
ance is the weighted Shapley value of uv,g· Routine calculation yields the following. 
( N) ( Wk Wj ) Yi v, g = 2c:wi + Wi + for all i, j, k E N wi + wj wi + wk 
Yi(v, {(ij)}) = 
Wi for all i,j E N. 
Wi +Wj 
From ( 4.1) and ( 4.2), and using L":�=l wi = 1 
Remembering that w1 2: w2 2: w3 and that c: < Hl - wi�w3 ) , (4.3) yields 





( 4 .4 )  
( 4.4 ) implies that gN is not strongly stable since {2, 3} will break links with 1 to 
move to the graph {(2, 3)}. Since gN is the unique strongly efficient graph, the theorem 
��. I 
Remark 4.5 : Note that since only a pair of agents need form a coalition to "block" gN, 
the result strengthens the intuitive content of the Jackson-Wolinsky result. 
Our next result uses weak stability instead of strong stability. 
Theorem 4.6 : There is no fully anonymous allocation rule Y satisfying component 
balance such that for each v E V, at least one strongly efficient graph is weakly stable. 
Proof:: Let N = {1, 2, 3}, and consider v such that v(gN) = 1 = v({(ij)}) and 
v( { (ij), (jk)}) = 1 + 2E .  Assume that 0 < E < J_12• 
Since Y is fully anonymous and component balanced, Yi ( v, {( ij)}) = Yj ( v, { ( ij)}) = 
�- Let gj {(ij), (jk)}. Note that {gjlj E N} is the set of strongly efficient graphs . 
Choose any j E N. Then, Yj( v, gj) 2 �- For, suppose Yj( v, gj) < �- Then, j can deviate 
unilaterally to change gj to { ( ij)} or { (j k)} by breaking the link with i or k respectively. 
So, if Yj(v, gj) < � and gj is induced bys, thens is not a Nash equilibrium, and hence 
not a CPNE. 
So, Yj(v,gj) 2 �- Since Y is fully anonymous and component balanced, Yi(v,gj) = 
Yk( v, gj) � � + E. Again, full anonymity of Y ensures that Yi( v, gN) = � for all i E N. 
Hence, { i, k} can deviate from gj and form the additional link ( ik). This will pre­
cipitate the complete graph. From preceding arguments, the deviation is profitable if 
1 E < 12'  
Letting sN denote the strategy n-tuple which induces gN, one notes that sN is a Nash 
equilibrium. Hence, the deviation of { i, k} to sN is not deterred by the possibility of a 
further deviation by either i or k. So, gj is not weakly stable. This completes the proof 
of the theorem. I 
Remark 4. 7 : Again note that only a 2-person coalition has to form to block gj. So, 
the result could have been proved in terms of "pairwise weak stability" , which is strictly 
weaker than pairwise stability. Hence, this generalizes Jackson and Wolinsky's basic 
result. 
Definition 4.8 : v satisfies monotonicity if for all g E G, for all i,j E N, v(g + (ij)) 2 
v(g). 
Thus, a monotonic value function has the property that additional links never decrease 
the value of the graph 9• A special class of monotonic value functions, the class considered 
9Hence, gN is strongly efficient. 
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by Dutta, et. al. (1995), is the set of graph-restricted games derived from super-additive 
TU games. Of course, there are also other contexts which might give rise to monotonic 
value functions. Dutta, et. al. proved that for the class of graph-restricted games 
derived from super-additive TU games, a large class of component balanced allocation 
rules (including all w-fair rules with w » 0) has the property that the set of weakly stable 
graphs is a subset of the set of graphs which are payoff-equivalent to gN. Moreover, gN 
itself is weakly stable10. Their proof can be easily extended to cover all monotonic value 
functions. We state the following result. 
Theorem 4.9: Suppose v is monotonic. Let Y be any w-fair allocation rule with w >> 0, 
and satisfying component balance. Then, gN is weakly stable for (v, Y). Moreover, if g 
is weakly stable for ( v, Y), then g is payoff - equivalent to gN P 
Proof: : The proof is omitted since it is almost idehtie'altbthat of Dutta, et. al. (1995). 
I 
Remark 4.10 : Note that Theorem 4.9 ensures that only strongly-efficient graphs are 
weakly stable. Thus, if our prediction is that only weakly-stable graphs will form, then 
this result guarantees that there will be no loss in efficiency. This guarantee is obviously 
stronger than that provided if some stable graph is strongly efficient. In the latter case, 
there is the possibility that other stable graphs are inefficient, and since there is no reason 
to predict that only the efficient stable graph will form, inefficiency can still occur. 
Unfortunately, monotonicity of the value function is a stringent requirement. There 
are a variety of problems in which the optimum network is a tree or a ring. For example, 
cost allocation problems give rise to the minimum-cost spanning tree12. Efficient airline 
routing or optimal trading arrangements may also imply that the star or ring is the 
efficient network.13 Indeed, in cases where there is a (physical) cost involved in setting 
up an additional link, gN will seldom be the optimal network. 
This provides the motivation to follow the "implementation approach" and prove 
results similar to that of Theorem 4 .9, but covering nonmonotonic value functions. First, 
we construct a component balanced allocation rule which is anonymous on the set of 
strongly stable graphs and which ensures that all strongly stable graphs are strongly 
efficient. 
In order to prove this result, we impose a restriction on the class of value functions. 
10 g and g' are payoff-equivalent under (v,Y) ifY(v, g) = Y(v, g'). Also, note that ifv is monotonic, 
then gN and hence graphs which are payoff-equivalent to gN are strongly efficient. 
11The result is true for a larger class of allocation rules, which is not being defined here to save space. 
12The minimum-cost spanning tree problem is a popular problem in Operations Research. See Sharkey 
(1995). 
13See Hendricks et.al. (1995) on the "hub and spokes" model of airline routing. See also Landa (1983) 
for an interesting account of why the ring is the efficient institutional arrangement for organization of 
exchange amongst tribal communities in East Papua New Guinea. 
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Definition 4.11 : A value function v E V is admissible if v(g) > 0 if g is not totally 
disconnected. 
Let V *  denote the set of admissible value functions. So, a value function is admissible 
if all graphs (except the trivial one in which no pair of agents is connected) have positive 
value. 
Before we formally define the particular allocation rule which will be used in the proof 
of the next theorem, we discuss briefly the key properties which will have to be satisfied 
by the rule. 
Choose some efficient g* E G. Supposes *  induces g*, and we want to ensure that g* is 
strongly stable. Now, consider any g which is different from g*, and lets induce g. Then, 
the allocation rule must punish at least o;ne a;gent .yvho has .deviated from s* to s. This 
'' •' - • •  ' • "' r -
is possible only if a deviant can be identified. This is trivial if there is some ( ij) E g lg*, 
because then both i and j must concur in forming the extra link (ij). However, if g Cg*, 
say (ij) E g*lg, then either i or j can unilaterally break the link. The only way to ensure 
that the deviant is punished is to punish both i and j. 
Several simple punishment schemes can be devised to ensure that at least two agents 
who have deviated from s* are punished sufficiently to make the deviation unprofitable. 
However, since the allocation rule has to be component balanced, these punishment 
schemes may result in some other agent being given more than the agent gets in g*. 
This possibility creates a complication because the punishment scheme has to satisfy 
an additional property. Since we also want to ensure that inefficient graphs are not 
strongly stable, agents have to be provided with an incentive to deviate from any graph 
which is not strongly efficient. Hence, the punishment scheme has to be relatively more 
sophisticated. 
Choose some strongly efficient g* with C (g*) = {hi, ... , hj}, and let >- be a strict 
ordering on arcs of g*. Consider any other graph g, and let C(g) = {h1, ... , hK}· 
The first step in the construction of the allocation rule is to choose agents who 
will be punished in some components hk E C(g). For reasons which will become 
clear later on, we only need to worry about components hk such that D(hk) = { i E 
N(hk)l (ij) E g *for somej (j. N(hk)} is nonempty. For such components, choose i (hk) -
iksuch thatN j E N(hk)\ { ik}, Nk (j. N(hk): 
(4.5) 
We will say that g is a *-supergraph of g* if for each h* E C(g*), there is h E C(g) 
such that N(h*) � N(h). Note that the fully connected graph is a *-supergraph of every 
graph. 
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Lemma 4.12 : Suppose g = (h1, ... , hK) is not a *-supergraphof g*. Then, ::lk, l E 
{1, ... , K} such that (ikiz) E g*. 
Proof: : Since g is not a *-supergraph, it follows that g is not fully connected, and 
that there exists a component h and players i,j such that i E N(h),j tJ. N(h) and 
(ij) E g*. Indeed, assume that for each hk E C (g), the set D(hk) is nonempty. 14 For 
every k = 1, 2, . . .  , K, there is jk tJ. N(hk) such that (ikjk) E g* and (idk) >- (ij) for all 
i E D(hk)\{ik} and for all j tJ. N(hk) with (ij) E g*. Let the >- - maximal element within 
the set {(i1,j1), ... , (idk)} be (ik*jk*). Let jk* E N(hz). Note that from the definition 
of the pair ( ik* jk*), it follows that l i= k*. Also, ( ik* jk*) E g*. It therefore follows that 
iz = jk* and j1 = ik*· Hence, (ik*iz) E g*. This completes the proof of the lemma. I 
The implication of Lemma 4.12 is the following. Suppose one or more agents de­
viate from g* to some g E G with components·'{hr, . .  ·;, hK}; Then, the set of agents 
{i(h1), ... , i(hK)} must contain a deviator. This property will be used intensively in the 
proof of the next theorem. 
Theorem 4.13 : Let v E V*. Then, there is a component balanced allocation rule Y* 
such that the set of strongly stable graphs is nonempty and contained in E( v). Moreover, 
Y* is anonymous on the set of strongly stable graphs. 
Proof: : Choose any v EV*. Fix g* E E(v). Let C(g*) ={hi, ... , hK}· An allocation 
rule Y* satisfying the required properties will be constructed which ensures that g* is 
strongly stable. Moreover, no g will be strongly stable unless it is in E( v ). 
For any S � N with ISi ;::: 2, let Gs be the set of graphs which are connected on S, 
and have no arcs outside S. So, Gs= {g E Gig is connected on S, and N(g) = S}. 
L t · v(g) Al 1 t · v(g) e as = mingEGs ISl(ISl--1). so, e Vm = mingEGN n(n--2). 
Choose any E such that 
The allocation rule Y* is defined by the following rules. Choose any g. 
(4.6) 
(Rule 1) For any h E C(g), suppose N(h) = UiEIN(hi) for some (non-empty) I C 
{1, ... , K}. Then, 
Yi*( v, g) = 
v(h) 
for alli E N(h). 
nh 
(Rule 2) Suppose N(h) i= LJiEI N(hi)VI � {1, . . .  , K}. Then, g is not a *-supergraph of 
g*. Choose jh E N(h) such that jh i= ih. Then, 
140therwise, we can restrict attention to those components for which D(hk) is nonempty. 
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Y*(v ) =
{ (nh -l)E ifi=/=jh 
i 'g v(h) - (nh -1)2c otherwise 
Clearly, the rule defined above is component balanced. We will show later that Y* is 
anonymous on the set of strongly stable graphs. We first show that the efficient graph 
g* is strongly stable under the above allocation rule. 
Lets* be the strategy profile defined as follows: For all i EN, si = {j E Nl(ij) E g*}. 
Clearly, s* induces g* in "f = (v, Y*). We need to show thats* is a SNE of r("f). 
Consider any s =I= s*, and let g be induced by s. Also, let T = {i E Nlsi =I= si}. 
Suppose h E C(g). If N(h) = Ui61N(hi) f()r so�e rnmemptyc,s-µbset I of {1, . . .  , K}, then 
Yi* (v,g) = v��)for alli E N(h). However, since g* is efficient, there exists some i EI such 
that v(hi) > v(h). So no member of hi is better off as a result of the deviation. Also, note nh� - nh • ' 
that T n N(hi) =I= 0. So, T does not have a profitable deviation in this case. 
Suppose there is h E C(g) such that N(h) =I= UiEIN(hi) for any nonempty subset I of 
{1, . . .  , K}. Then, g is not a *-supergraph of g*, and let G(g) = {hi, . . .  , hL}· From the 
above lemma, there exists ( ikiz) E g* where ik and iz are the players who are punished 
in hk and hz respectively. Obviously, rn{ik, i1} =/= ¢. But from Rule (2), it follows that 
Yi:(v, g) = (nhk - l)c and Yi;(v, g) = (nh1 -l)c. Given the value of E, it follows that both 
ik and ih are worse-off from the deviation. 
We now show that if g is strongly stable, then g E E(v). So suppose that g is an 
inefficient graph. 
(i) If g is an inefficient graph which is a *-supergraphof g*, then there exist h E C (g), h* E 
G(g*) such that N(h*) � N(h) and 
v(h) v(h*) . 
Yi*(v,g) = 
--
< Yi*(v,g*) = --for alli E N(h*). nh nh* 
So, each i E N(h*) can deviate to the strategy s;. This will induce the component 
h* where they are all strictly better off. 
(ii) Suppose that g is not a *-supergraph of g*. Let G(g) = (h1, . . .  , hK)· Without loss 
of generality, let nh1 � • • •  � nhK· Since g is not a *-supergraph of g*, Rule (2) of the 
allocation rule applies and we know that there exist hk, hz E C(g), and ihk E N(hk), ih1 E 
N(hz) such that Yi*h ( v, g) = (nhk - l)c and Yih ( v, g) = (nh1 -l)c. Let s be such that k l 
(i) Vj tJ. {ihk,ihJ,sj = sj. 
(ii) Sih k = {j lj E Sih k orj = ih1}. 
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(iii) Sihz 
= {jlj E Bih 1orj = ihk}. 
Let g be the graph induced by s. Notice that g = g + (ihkih1) . We claim that 
(4.7) 
Let h E C(g) be the component containing players ihk and ihz · Notice that nr,, > 
max( nhk, nhJ Given the value of E, it follows that 
This shows that the coalition { ihk, ih1} has a deviation which makes both players 
better off. 
The second half of the proof also shows that g is strongly stable only if g is a *­
supergraph of g*. From Rule (1), it is clear that Y* is anonymous on all such graphs. 
This observation completes the proof of the theorem. Ill 
Our next theorem shows that if a stronger restriction is placed on the class of per­
missible value functions, an allocation rule can be constructed which ensures 'double 
implementation' in strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. 
Definition 4.14: A graph g is focussed if for each h E C(g) , there is ih E N(h) such 
that (ihj) Eh for all j E N(h) \ {ih}· 
So, a graph is focussed if there is an agent in each component who is connected to all 
other agents in the component. Let V be the set of all value functions v such that 
(i) v(g) = 0 only if g is completely disconnected. 
(ii) There exists g* E E( v) such that g* is focussed. 
We now assume that the class of permissible value functions is V. This is a much 
stronger restriction than the assumption used in the previous theorem. However, there 
are several interesting problems which give rise to such value functions. Indeed, the 
two special models discussed by Jackson and Wolinsky (the symmetric connections and 
coauthor models) both give rise to value functions in V. 
Choose some v E V, and let g* E E(v) be focussed. Assume that (hi, . . .  , hk) are 
the components of g*, and let ik be the player who is connected to all other players in 
N(hk) .15 
15If more than one such player exists, then any selection rule can be employed. 
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Let >-p be a strict order on the player set N satisfying the following conditions: 
(i) Vi, j EN, if i E N(hk) , j  E N(hz) and k < l, then i>-pJ· 
(ii) ik>-pj for all j E N(hk)\ { ik}, k = 1, . . .  , K. 
So, >-p satisfies two properties. First, all agents in N(hk) are ranked above agents in 
N(hk+l). Second, within each component, the player who is connected to all other 
players is ranked first. 
Finally, choose any E satisfying ( 4.6). 
The allocation rule Y* is defined by the following rules. Choose any g and h E C(g). 
(Rule 1) Suppose N(h) = N(h*) for some h*'E O(g*·): Then,· 
Yi*(v, g) = v
(h)
for alli E N(h). nh 
(Rule 2) Suppose N(h) C N(h*) for some h* E C(g*). Let Jh be the "minimal" element 
of N(h) under the order >-p· Then, for all i E N(h) , 
* { (nh - l)E if i # Jh 1i (v, g) = v(h) - (nh - 1)2E if i = Jh 
(Rule 3) Suppose N(h) g; N(h*) for any h* E C(g*) . Let Jh be the "minimal" element 
of N(h) under the order >-p· Then, for all i E N(h) , 
The allocation rule has the following features. First, provided a component consists 
of the same set of players as some component in g*, the value of the component is divided 
equally amongst all the agents in the component. Second, punishments are levied in all 
other cases. The punishment is more severe if players form links across components in 
g*. 
Let s* be the strategy profile given by si = {j E Nl(ij) E g*} for all i E N, and 
let C(g*) = {hi, . . .  , h'k }. We first show that if agents in components hi, . . .  , hk are 
using the strategies si , then no group of agents in hk will find it profitable to deviate. 
Moreover, this is independent of the strategies chosen by agents in components coming 
"after" hk. 
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· Lemma 4.15 : Let v EV. Suppose sis the strategy profile given by Si= si Vi E N(h'k), 
'Ilk= 1, ... , K where K::::; K. Then, there is nos' such that f?(s') > f?(s) for all i ET 
where T = {i E N(hjJls� # si}· 
Proof: : Consider the case K = 1. Let g be the graph induced bys. Note that hi E C(g). 
Consider any s', and let g' be the graph induced bys'. Suppose T = {i E N(hi)lsi # 
sa # 0. 
Case ( 1): There exists h E C(g') such that N(h) = N(hi). In this case, Rule (1) applies, 
and we have Yt(v,g') = 1;��) I ::::; 1;��1{) 1 = Yt(v,g)Vi E N(hi). So no i E N(hi) benefits 
from the deviation. 
Case (2): There exists h E C(g') such that N(h) n N(hi) # ¢, and N(h) g N(hi). In 
this case, Rule (3) applies, and we have 
Y/(v, g') = � < }i*(v, g)Vi E N(hi) n N(h). 
Noting that N(hi) n N(h) n T # 0, we must have f?(s) > f?(s') for some i ET. 
Case (3): There exists h E C(g') such that N(h) C N(hi). 
Noting that there is ii who is connected to everyone in N(hi), either ii E T or 
T = N(h). If ii ET, then since Ji� (s') ::::; (nh - l)E < Ji� (s), the lemma is true. Suppose 
ii r/:. T. Ruling out the trivial case where a single agent breaks away, i5 we have ITI 2: 2. 
From Rule 2 or Rule 3, at least one of the agents must be worse off. 
Hence, in all possible cases, there is some i E T who does not benefit from the 
deviation. 
The proof can be extended in an obvious way for all values of K. I 
Lemma 4.16 : Let v EV. Let g be the graph induced by a strategy profiles. Suppose 
there exists h E C(g) such that N(h) C N(hi). Then, g is not weakly stable. 
Proof: : Ifs is not a Nash equilibrium of r( 'Y), then there is nothing to prove. So, assume 
that s constitutes a Nash equilibrium. 
We will prove the lemma by showing that there is a credible deviation from s for 
a coalition D c N(hi), IDI = 2. The game induced on the coalition D is defined as 
r('r, SN\D) = (D, {Si}iED' ft) where f](s�) = Yj*(v, g(s�, SN\D)) for all j ED. We show 
that there is a Nash equilibrium in this two-person game which Pareto-dominates the 
payoff corresponding to s. 
16The agent then gets 0. 
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Suppose there is i E N(hi) \ N(h), j t/:. N(hi) such that (ij) E g. Then, Yi*( v, g) = �· 
Since s is a Nash equilibrium, this implies that i by a unilateral deviation cannot induce 
a graph g' in which i will be in some component such that N(h') � N(hi) . 
Now, let j be the >-p-maximal agent in N(h) . Consider the coalition D = {i,j}. 
Choose s �  = {j}, and let sj be the best response to s � in the game I'(11, SN\D)· Then, 
(s �, s j) must be a Nash equilibrium in I'(11, SN\D).17 Using Rule (2), it is trivial to check 
that both i and j gain by deviating to s' from s. 
Hence, we can now assume that if N(h) c N(hi), then there exist {h1, . . .  , hL} � C(g) 
such that N(hi) = LJi=l, ... ,L N(hi) . 18 Note that L 2: 2. 
Wlog, let 1 be the >-p-maximal agent in N(hi) , and 1 E N(h1). Let i be the >-p­
maximal agent in N(h2), and let D = {1, i}. 
Suppose L > 2. Then, consider 81 = s1 U {i}, and let Bi be the best response to 81 in 
the game I'(!, SN\D)· Note that 1 can never be the residual claimant in any component, 
and that 1 E h It then follows that (81, Bi) is a Nash equilibrium in r('Y, SN\D) which 
Pareto-dominates the payoffs (of D) corresponding to the original strategy profile s. 
Suppose L = 2. Let S = {sis= (81, si, s_D)for some(s1, si) E 81 x Si. Let G be the set 
of graphs which cari. be induced by D subject to the restriction that both 1 and i belong 
to a component which is connected on N(hi) . Let g be such that v(g) = max9E0v(g), 
and suppose that s induces g. Then, note that i E s1 and 1 E h 
Now, Yi* (v,g) = Yi* (v, g) = v��)· Clearly, Y/(v,g) > Y/(v,g) for j ED. If (81, si) is 
a Nash equilibrium in r('Y, SN\D), then this completes the proof of the Lemma. Suppose 
(s1, si) is not a Nash equilibrium of I'(')', sN\D)· Then, the only possibility is that i has a 
profitable deviation since 1 can never become the residual claimant. Let si be the best 
response to 81 in r('Y, SN\D)· Note that 1 E h Let g denote the induced graph. We must 
therefore have Yi* ( v, g) > Yi* ( v, g) .19 Obviously, Yi* ( v, g) > Yi* ( v, g). Since 81 is also a 
best response to Si in r(!', SN\D), this completes the proof of the lemma. Ill 
We can now prove the following. 
Theorem 4.1 7 : Let v E if. Then, there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y 
satisfying the following 
(i) The set of strongly stable graphs is nonempty. 
(ii) If g is weakly stable, then g E E( v ) .  
(iii) Y is anonymous over the set of weakly stable graphs. 
17The fact that i has no profitable deviation from s� follows from the assumption that the original 
strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. 
18 Again, we are ignoring the possible existence of isolated individuals. 
19This follows since 1 is now in a component containing more agents. 
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Proof: : Clearly, the allocation rule Y defined above is component balanced. We first 
show that the efficient graph g* is strongly stable by showing that s* is a strong Nash 
equilibrium of r( "(). 
Let C(g*) = {hi, . . .  , hjd. 
Let s I- s*, g be the graph induced by s, and T = {i E Nlsi I- si}. Let t* 
argmin1:::;j:::;Ksi I- si for some i E N(hj) .  
By Lemma 4.15, it follows that at least one member in N(ht* ) n T does not profit by 
deviating from the strategy s*. This shows that the graph g* is strongly stable. 
We now show that if g is not efficient, then it cannot be weakly stable. Let s be a 
strategy profile which induces the graph g. We have the following cases. 
Case {la): There exists h E C(g) such that N(hi) = N(h) and v(h) < v(hi) . 
Suppose all individuals i in N(hi) deviate to s;. Clearly, all individuals in N(hi) gain 
from this deviation. Moreover, Lemma 4.15 shows that no sub-coalition of N(hi) has 
any further profitable deviation. Hence, s cannot be a CPNE of I'("!) in this case. 
Case {ib): There does not exist h E C(g) such that N(h) � N(hi) . 
In this case all players in N (hi) are either isolated (in which case they get zero) or 
they are in (possibly different) components which contain players not in N(hi) . Using 
Rule (3) of the allocation rule, it follows that 
Yi( v, g) :S �Vi E N(h�) . 
So all players in N(hi) can deviate to the strategy s;. Obviously, this will make them 
strictly better off. That this is a credible deviation follows from Lemma 4.15. 
Case {Jc): There exists h E C(g) such that N(h) C N(hi) . 
In this case, it follows from Lemma 4.17 that there is a credible deviation for a 
coalition D C N (hi) . 
Case (2): If there exists h E C(g) such that N(h) = N(hi) and v(h) = v(hi) , then apply 
the arguments of Case 1 to h� and so on. 
The preceding arguments show that if g is weakly stable, then : 
(i) N(hi) = N(hi) for each i E {1, . . .  , K}. 
(ii) v(hi) = v(hi) for each i E {1, . . .  , K}. 
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These show that all weakly stable graphs must be efficient. Furthermore, it follows 
from Rule (1) that Y is anonymous on all such graphs. This completes the proof of the 
theorem. I 
5 Conclusion 
The central theme in this paper has been to examine the possibility of constructing allo­
cation rules which will ensure that efficient networks of agents form when the individual 
agents decide to form or severe links amongst themselves. Exploiting the insights pro­
vided by Jackson and Wolinsky (1995), it is shown that in general it may not be possible 
to reconcile efficiency with stability if the allocation rule is required to be anonymous on 
all graphs. 
However, we go on to argue that if our prediction is that only efficient graphs will form, 
then the requirement that the allocation rule be anonymous on all graphs is unnecessarily 
stringent. We suggest that a "mechanism design" approach is more appropriate, and show 
that under almost all value functions, the nonempty set of (strongly) stable graphs will 
be a subset of the efficient graphs under an allocation rule which is anonymous on the 
domain of strongly stable graphs. A stronger domain restriction allows us to prove that 
the above result also holds when strong stability is replaced by weak stability. Since 
these allocation rules will treat agents symmetrically on the graphs which are "likely to 
be observed," it seems that stability can be reconciled with efficiency after all. 
19 
References 
[1] Aumann, R., and Myerson, R. (1988), Endogenous Formation of Links between 
Players and Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value, in A Roth (ed.) The
Shapley Value, Cambridge University Press. 
[2] Bernheim, B., Peleg, B., and Whinston, M. (1987), Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria 
I. Concepts, Journal of Economic Theory, 42, 1-12. 
[3] Dutta, B., Nouweland, A. van den., and Tijs, S. (1995), Link Formation in Coop­
erative Situations, Discussion Paper No. 95-02, Indian Statistical Institute, New 
Delhi. 
[4] Goyal, S. (1993), Sustainable Communication Networks, Tinbergen Institute Dis­
cussion Paper TI 93-250. 
[5] Hart, S., and Kurz, M. (1983), Endogenous Formation of Cooperative Structures, 
Econometrica, 51, 1047-1064. 
[6] Hendricks, K., Piccione, M., and Tan, G. (1995), The Economics of Hubs: The Case 
of Monopoly, Review of Economic Studies, 62, 83-100. 
[7] Jackson, M., and Wolinsky, A. (1995), A Strategic Model of Economic and Social 
Networks, to appear in Journal of Economic Theory. 
[8] Landa, J. (1983), The Enigma of the Kula Ring: Gift Exchanges and Primitive Law 
and Order, International Review of Law and Economics, 3, 137-160. 
[9] Marschak, T., and Reichelstein, S. (1993), Communication Requirements for In­
dividual Agents in Network Mechanisms and Hierarchies, in J. Ledyard, ed., The 
Economics of Information Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency and Stability, 
Kluwer Publishing Company. 
[10] Myerson, R. (1977), Graphs and Cooperation in Games, Mathematics of Operations 
Research, 2, 225-229. 
[11] Myerson, R. (1991), Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
[ 12] Nouweland, A. van den. (1993), Games and Graphs in Economic Situations, Ph.d 
dissertation, Tilburg University. 
[13] Qin, C. (1993), Endogenous Formation of Cooperative Structures, Working Paper, 
Department of Economics, University of California at Santa Barbara, California. 
[ 14] Sharkey, W. (1993), Network Models in Economics, forthcoming in Handbook of 
Operations Research and Management Science, North-Holland. 
[15] Wellman, B., and S. Berkowitz (1988), Social Structure:A Network Approach, Cam­
bridge University Press. 
20 
